




Rhetoric and the Emotions
Rhetoric has long been associated with a type of emotive speech that persuades by non-rational means. This reductive association has been used to discredit rhetoric both as a type of knowledge and as an ethical practice for sustaining political community. Since Plato, Western philosophy has often regarded abstract, logical thought as a superior mode of reasoning with unique access to higher principles of social and natural order. The separation of passions from reason was further enforced in the modern era as emotion came to be viewed as a fundamentally physiological process. Yet rhetoric’s implication that reason blends inescapably with emotion makes it uniquely attuned to the affective binding of individuals through speech, particularly through metaphorical figures. Following the decline of rationalist models of scientific enquiry, the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy, and recent explorations in Neuroscience, the emotional dimensions of reasoning are again of interest and invite the revival of rhetoric as an ethical practice.
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1	Introduction
Emotions concern our innermost, natural responses to the world. Fear, joy, anger, love, and so on, are dispositions that grip us and motivate us in powerful ways that reason or logic alone cannot. We are often 'possessed' or captured by emotions in a manner that defies easy explanation or refutation. Emotions stick to us and take us to places we can't always predict or, when we reflect upon it, where we would not always wish to go. For these reasons, emotions have long been regarded as the enemy of philosophical reason. To rely upon emotion is, accordingly, to bypass the strictures of logical thought and to judge by irrational means. To make someone feel good, for example, is not the same as making them understand what is good. Philosophy's centuries-old dispute with rhetoric turns precisely on this critical view of emotion as a detour around reason.
But if proponents of philosophical reason often view it with suspicion, emotion is also widely understood as a vital means to bind individuals together in common cause. Shared sentiments rooted in common emotions are thought to supply the solidaristic basis to patriotism, religious faith, national identity or humanitarian action. Unless we activate such sentiments and reason through them, it is difficult to make judgements about our allegiances as citizens or about the mutual threats and benefits to the societies in which we live. Rationality may permit us to determine that some idea is logically correct or incorrect but it will not tell us for whom or how much it matters. To do that requires our consciences to be pricked, our attachments to be mobilised, and our shared senses of sympathy or antipathy to press upon our reason. A rhetoric that neglects the emotional dimension of judgement making surrenders the power to inspire and move people.
These contrasting approaches to emotion and its place in how we communicate inform different notions of what a community is and how its members relate ethically. Behind the critique of emotion in rhetoric (indeed, behind the critique of rhetoric in general) is often a view that a community ought to adhere to sober and independent principles of rationality that are invulnerable to manipulation. Those who view emotions as inescapable in public discourse, however, tend to think of community as an order in which passion, as much as reason, has a legitimate function in securing common judgements. Throughout the history of western philosophy, efforts have thus been made both to separate reason from emotion but also to align them in ways deemed properly ethical or in tune with our sentiments. These efforts respond to changing notions of what kind of phenomenon counts as an emotion and how it relates to discourse, human cognition, and the ethical basis of social order.
2	Ancient Philosophy and Rhetoric
The roots of philosophy’s suspicion of emotion and rhetoric are commonly found in Plato’s critique of the Sophists – the teachers of, amongst other things, the practical arts of speaking in democratic Athens. That critique was, at the same time, part of a deeper dispute over the proper mode of organising the ancient political order, or polis, whose democratic system Plato despised. Aristotle, his student, similarly rejected democracy as the ideal mode of government yet he accepted the notion of the polis as a self-governing community of speakers. By consequence, Aristotle endorsed both the arts of speaking and, within limits, the appeals to emotion as integral skills of the citizen. Underlying these pre-modern reflections on rhetoric and emotion, however, was an all-embracing view of philosophy as the love of wisdom and the pursuit of truth in the fulfilment of a good and just life. Although Plato and Aristotle hold critical views of rhetoric and its potential for excess, nonetheless they understand philosophy to entail a passionate commitment to live wisely and to pursue excellence in all things. In that respect, ancient philosophy maintains a connection between emotion and reason that, eventually, is lost in modern philosophy.
2.1	Plato and Aristotle

For Plato, passions and emotions are essentially bodily dispositions linked to people’s material appetites and hence external to their capacity for rational thought (see Meyer, 2000). In his idealist division between contingent matter and essential form, only knowledge that conforms to eternal principles inscribed within the soul can be deemed legitimate ‘arts’. Thus rhetoric – which in his view aims to persuade by stirring people’s passions and not by engaging their minds – cannot be classified as a true ‘art’ but is a ‘knack’ for ‘pandering’ to opinion: oratory, Socrates claims in Gorgias, ‘makes pleasure its aim instead of good […] it is merely a knack and not an art because it has no rational understanding of the nature of the various things it applies to or the person to whom it applies, so that it can’t explain anything’ (Gorgias 465). Philosophy, on the other hand, speaks directly to principles embedded in the eternal Forms and is thus the only genuine source of rational argument. For this reason, sophistic instruction in the skills of persuasion cannot constitute genuine knowledge and is, ultimately, merely the practice of provoking pleasure or sympathy. Thus Plato dismissed rhetoric as a type of knowledge akin to cookery: satisfying to the body but not in any way a true medium to connect the mind to the higher principles that govern it.
Plato’s reduction of rhetoric to a means of satisfying appetites rather than the intellect forms a central plank in the western conception of philosophy as knowledge of abstract, eternal principles that escape the contingencies of the material world. ‘Reason, Logos’, as Michel Meyer puts it, ‘is at heart an anti-body’ (Meyer, 2000: 17). Emotions are thus pitted against philosophical reason as essentially corrupting of thought and ultimately irrational in nature. It follows that a rational political order – one that follows ideal principles – must disavow contingencies such as the body in order to align justice with the higher order of values. Thus Plato argued in his Republic that the social classes who make up the ideal state must be strictly separated, as are their corresponding elements in the soul. The philosopher-kings and also the guardians must live an ascetic life, divorced from normal emotional demands and social interactions. 
Plato’s student, Aristotle, by contrast, recognised the practice of rhetorical persuasion and the appeal to emotions as an intrinsic and valuable part of the ideal political community. Not only does Aristotle set out a theory of practical deliberation as the basis of a self-governing order of equal citizens, he also devotes attention to the role of emotions in helping form judgements concerning the common good. Unlike Plato, Aristotle regarded the human capacity to debate and argue over the character of the good as a distinctive feature of its nature, an ability that distinguishes man from other animals. If man’s nature was to be political, then disagreement and argument were internal to a natural order and not a diminution of it. That is not to say that Aristotle thought just any kind of argumentative practice was permissible. He, too, upheld scientific reason against the perils of sophistry. Nor was he an enthusiastic advocate of democracy. But, unlike Plato, Aristotle understood a stable order to be one that incorporated difference and disagreement, aligning them to the higher needs of the polis rather than rejecting them outright.
For Aristotle, uncontrolled passions are certainly a danger in public deliberation and can lead to demagoguery. In legal judgements, especially, it is important to avoid being swayed through emotion, since judgement there depends fundamentally on evaluation of evidence. But in political debate – where objective criteria are not the principal source of judgement – emotions help citizens reason to the extent that they support understanding of what is right or wrong, just or unjust. Emotions are part of cognitive judgement and not simply wild, uncontrolled feelings unchecked by reason. To arouse anger over some situation, for example, was to bring an audience closer to a sense of injustice and a need for action. Emotional appeals can thus illuminate our implicit understanding of the circumstances we face and how we may rationally grasp their import for us. Moreover he says that a state can not be integrated by laws only. As he points out in book  8 of EN an emotional philia (friendship) is more important for a good state than justice.
Thus emotions are not simply contingent appetites but first of all social phenomena, markers of communal understandings and allegiances. We can not understand them as mental states or qualities of a single individual (as modern philosophers did) but as something which circulates between us, which is provoced by others. Aristotle therefore underscored the importance in rhetoric not only of experiencing emotions but also of understanding emotions in others. As Garver points out, Aristotle is not interested in all emotions, particularly not ‘base’ passions (Garver, 1994). Rather, he is interested in ‘civic emotions’, the passions and emotions that make for effective citizens and virtuous judements. To make emotional appeals was therefore to act upon the shared dispositions, allegiances and common understandings of a community. This awareness of emotion brings to the fore an ethical responsibility towards the polis and its common concerns rather than, as Plato assumed, a will to manipulate audiences or make a poor argument seem good. For that reason, Aristotle placed special emphasis upon the ethos of the speaker, that is, the capacity of the speaker to demonstrate credibility through speech by revealing his good character, not least through sensible and measured argumentation.
2.2	Emotions, Persuasion and the Classical Idea of Politics 
The history of rhetorical theory and advice since classical Greece has wavered between Plato’s critique and Aristotle’s endorsement of a rhetoric that makes a (partial) case for the emotions. This reflects the contrasting views that rhetoric must orient itself towards truth and higher principles beyond the contingent opportunities of the moment and the view that rhetoric necessarily stimulates and mobilises passions as part of the task of securing allegiance from listeners. Each side clearly has its potential errors – rhetoric without passion may fail to grip its audience but a rhetoric too keen on passions can lead its audience astray. Where the classical idea of philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom prevailed – that is, when politics is conceived as the active and collective participation in sustaining the common good – rhetoric was regarded as, in part, the creative management of emotions. Once this idea of politics declined, as we will see in the next section, rhetoric is consequently diminished as a political art and passions and emotions are treated as an obstacle to maintaining order.
Marcus Tullius Cicero gave a defense of rhetoric and its orientation towards emotions in the practice of argument. For Cicero, rhetoric had the job of combining both wisdom and eloquence – that is, a dedication to truth but also a requirement to make this truth emotionally meaningful by stirring passions. Cicero certainly maintains Aristotle’s notions that speech is a tool for rational deliberation and that a good speaker has to be a good man, but in texts such as De oratore he also affirmed (by way of the character Antonius) the view that pathos, rather than logos, is ultimately what persuades: ‘For people make many more judgements under the infuence of hate or affection or partiality or anger or grief or joy or hope or fear or delusion or some other emotion, than on the basis of truth or an objective rule’ (Cicero, 2001: p. 170). Cicero’s ‘ideal orator’ is a vehement speaker, aware of the emotional pressure points of the audience, and keen to employ these to illuminate good sense. Cicero also underscored the power of ethos but unlike Aristotle – for whom ethos flowed from good, logical argument – authority stemmed from an existing reputation that would impress the audience and make an argument seem more sympathetic. The speaker, he claims, must embody his argument in his performance, like an actor. Thus for all his insistence on virtue and truthfullness, Cicero’s preference for vehement rhetoric tends to underscore more the crafty mobilisation of passions and less the capacity for sober, cognitive judgement. Quintilian follows Cicero in claiming that only ‘the passions make us speak’ [Pectus est enim quod disertos facit]« (Quint. inst. or. X 7, 15).
In a different direction, St Augustine’s rhetoric of religious ‘conversion’ later built upon the Ciceronian inheritance, mixing emotion, character and argument in a blend aimed not at persuading external political communities but of bringing the inner self into communion with God. For St Augustine, Christianity could not be conveyed dogmatically, simply as a literal truth, but was elaborated through an internal deliberation in which reason was shaped by the development of character and a deep emotional attunement with God’s Grace. Here ethos and pathos move the mind to embrace what it already ‘knows’ but refuses to hear. Conversion therefore required the individual to undergo an argument with a divided self. A neo-Platonist, Augustine rejected the sophistic view of rhetoric as the manipulation of base desires but accepted that the truths of Christian teaching involved a personal transformation through an inward dialogue that called upon the range of classical rhetorical techniques. 
For Augustine, like later rhetoricians, language functions on a figurative and not purely literal basis. Human passions were activated by means of metaphors that stirred the soul and raised it to a higher level. Here, again, the classical view of philosophy as a search for wisdom, a commitment of the self to standards of excellence, is still operative but now in personal communion with God, not the prevailing political order. Being emotionally moved by language was thus regarded as one of the primary legacies of the classical idea of politics, where participation in a community of speakers blended sentiment and reason in a common enterprise (see Skinner, 2002a). The notion of metaphor as a binding agent for an ethical community remained central in the Rennaisance revival of classical political thought – particularly the works of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian. Indeed as the naturalness of community declined with the end of the Roman Empire, the idea of political speech as a means to mobilise citizens towards common, ‘republican’ sentiments took greater salience, as is evident in the ideas of Niccolo Machiavelli and other ‘humanistic’ writers influenced by Roman ideas. Rhetoric thus remains important as an element of republican political virtues not because it let emotions run wild but because the ground of community itself was still thought to be a sensus communis to which citizens were passionately committed (see Grassi, 2001). 
3	Modernity and the Decline of Rhetoric
The civic function of the rhetorical arts – their role in sustaining a self-governing community through deliberation over the sensus communis – was radically diminished between the 17th and 18th centuries as a consequence of a number of factors, including: the decline of humanist ideals with the end of the Italian city states, the emergence of the ‘sovereign’ idea of political authority, and the progress of scientific enquiry. Rhetoric gradually came to be disassociated from the emotional sustenance of political community and, instead, relegated to the realm of ‘literary’ invention (see Garsten, 2006). In this shift from Rennaisance to modern worldviews, emotional phenomena (passions, sentiments, and feelings) were gradually deprived of their explicitly civic associations and connected increasingly to mute, physiological processes at work in the individual’s body. Philosophy loses its connection to the search for worldly wisdom and the pursuit of excellence, substituting those goals with a narrower conception of ‘truth’ based on the logical and empirical validity of propositions (see Meyer, 1994). Central in this evolution was the work of a political thinker, Thomas Hobbes, and later the secular, scientific culture of the Enlightenment. 
3.1	Hobbes and Sovereignty
Thomas Hobbes was himself educated in the civic humanist ideals of self-government and the rhetorical arts inherited from classical and Rennaisance thinkers (see Skinner, 2002b). However, with the English Civil War he came to reject humanist values, particularly the skill of speech as a medium for self-government. It was precisely the ability of political leaders to manipulate popular feelings and desires by means of words that discredited rhetoric in his view. Religious factions, he claimed, mobilised such sentiments for political causes by twisting meanings and with little care for the social disorder that ensued. Hobbes’s mechanistic materialism, which drew upon Galileo’s scientific insights, reduced emotions to the inner motions of an individual’s body. Unless stopped by some force, human ‘appetites’ and ‘aversions’ would impact upon the wider body politic, unregulated by reason or secure knowledge. Rhetorical terms such as metaphor – a device stimulating emotional attachment according to many humanists – were now regarded as slippery mechanisms misdirecting individuals in their judgement and hence the means to social conflict (see Hobbes, 1991). 
Hobbes’s idea of the sovereign state – or Leviathan – was conceived as a force to stop all rhetorical conversation, to decide externally the terms by which people were governed, and hence to bring order to the squabbling multitude. Hobbes was thus acutely aware of the ability of speech to liberate and violently accentuate feelings. Rather than express some higher order of moral truth written in the soul (as in Plato), Hobbes accepted the modern, sceptical view that nature provided no intrinsic principle of settled order. The authority of the sovereign was therefore an answer to the wild and uncontrolled force of natural passions stirred by preachers. The sovereign was equated neither with ‘the people’ nor the body of a king. Instead, it was conceived abstractly, a disembodied legal authority unmoved either by Divine or by common sentiments. Although liberals may wince at Hobbes’s authoritarianism, his secular justification for political authority was central to the emergence of the modern liberal state with its elevation of legal authority over ‘private’ opinion. Hobbes’s defense of political power based upon a rationally motivated contract, functioning autonomously from its citizens, relegated human passions and the conversations to which they give rise to an extra political realm.
3.2	Science and Emotion
Hobbes’s scepticism and his absolute rejection of rhetoric was one step in what, later, Max Weber described as the general ‘disenchantment’ of modern, western society brought by the decline of religious beliefs, the rise of secular authority, and the expansion of science (Weber, 1991). Not only did social order express no intrinsic divine or moral orientation, human feeling itself came increasingly to be regarded as an essentially physiological process unconnected to a higher ‘soul’ or to natural social bonds. The scientific movement known as the Enlightenment tended to regard emotions and passions as essentially inner processes of the individual body, disconnected from the superior capacity to reason and think. Cartesian philosophy, for example, provided a rationale to this separation of mind from body and, in so doing reinforced the view that rationality unfolded on a different plane from emotion, which was corporeal, irrational and chaotic. Descartes, like many other thinkers of the 17th century, still recognised ‘intellectual passions’ as emotional sources to reasoning (see James, 1997), but the logic of his philosophy was to separate reason and emotion. A superior thinking mind was one that exerted control over the maelstrom of sensation, rising above the ‘weaker’ instincts (often attributed  to women and children). The emergence of modern psychology is also associated with this secular reduction of emotions to unthinking physiology (see Dixon, 2006; Damasio, 2006).
The Enlightenment was recognised by its promoters as having brought tremendous advantages to society, overcoming the dominance of blind superstition and thoughtless custom in favour of the critical assessment of opinion based on logical propositions and empirical evidence. Science, as many of its early defenders insisted, was a force of rhetorical significance in so far as it fundamentally altered how the world was talked about and who, with authority, could speak about it. But the scientific worldview further diminished the political legitimacy of emotional attachments and humans’ affective relation to the world upon which earlier rhetorical cultures had thrived (see Caputo, 2013). Even David Hume, himself a proponent of a sceptical philosophy, bemoaned the loss of ancient rhetoric and its power to move audiences. For all its scientific advances, modern politics lacked the eloquence and ability to stir the sentiments of its classical forebears (Hume, 1987). 
Similar concerns about the abstraction and lack of emotional depth in Enlightened culture and scientific rationality haunted later philosophers, threatening to undo the otherwise beneficial effects of the Enlightenment by leaving mankind in a condition of perpetual alienation. Kant’s philosophy, for instance, offered a rational morality but elevated reason above the inclinations that drove ordinary emotional attachments. In the wake of romantic reaction to the Enlightenment, philosophers such as Hegel sought to reconnect abstract philosophy to a deeper appreciation of the traditions and customs in which emotion and desire were invested. But Hegel’s philosophy was addressed primarily to the realm of thought, not to speech. His work remained committed to the primacy given by the Enlightenment to conceptual reason and its inner unfolding (however ‘dialectically’ engaged in the world). 
After Hegel, western philosophy began to divide between those committed to elaborating – against rationalism – the indissoluble link between language, emotions and the world (such as Nietzsche, Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein) and those seeking – in favour of rationalism – to purify language of such a link by elaborating a refined, logical language of rational propositions and inferences (such as the early Wittgenstein, Carnap and other members of the so-called ‘Vienna Circle’). Whereas the first looked to the poetic and metaphoric character of language as a marker of the excess and creativity of human existence, the second sought to stabilise meaning by eliminating abstractions and clarifying logical relations. In the second half of the twentieth century these two groups came to exemplify ‘Continental’ and ‘analytical’ approaches to philosophy. Whilst neither was routinely concerned with rhetoric, the emphasis of the first group on language as a bearer of existential concerns chimed, at a fairly high level of abstraction, with earlier pre-modern preoccupations with metaphor and the emotional basis of community (see Grassi 1983; 2001).
4	 After Modernity: Culture, Discourse and Affects
Rhetoric re-emerged intermittently as a critical resource across the twentieth century in the wake of the declining confidence in the supremacy of reason and natural scientific techniques to enhance and harmonise human freedom. In part this is a consequence of the growing recognition of language as a determining factor in shaping human subjectivity. But it also followed an awareness of the ineradicable presence of passions and emotions in human psychology as well as in social and political life; an issue brought to the fore in different ways, for example, by Freud and, later, feminism. Although confidence in human rationality and scientific technique has hardly disappeared, it now intertwines with a stronger sense of the interconnections between rationality and emotion. On this basis, rhetoric has resurfaced, not as part of a new cosmology to replace western reason or a return to a premodern model of politics but, rather, as a corrective to the dogmatic inclinations of rationality and technology in a ‘post’ or ‘late’ modern age. What, as yet, remains uncertain is how much this new attention to emotion in the form of culture, discourse and affects might enable rhetorical practices to fulfill an ethical role in societies ever more sensitive to claims of difference and identity.
4.1	The Linguistic Turn: from Culture to Discourse

Although it was not particularly focussed upon emotions or rhetoric, the ‘linguistic turn’ heralded an important philosophical engagement with the various qualities language brought to all areas of human communication, from Philosophy to Anthropology and Sociology. In different ways the works of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, linguistic philosophy, as well as Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics recharged interest in language as the medium of human rationality and feeling. While different thinkers engaged language in relation to distinct domains, the broad thrust of the linguistic turn was to reconceptualise human agency as something not presupposed but achieved through language and discourse. Instead of a neutral receptacle for objectively viewing the world, subjectivity was itself shaped through the techniques of categorising, enunciating and exhorting employed in language. For Heidegger, language was the ‘house of Being’, a horizon inside which human experience disclosed its world. Not only did language therefore limit what was knowable, it also closed off alternative ways of being as it did so. For the later Wittgenstein, by contrast, meanings are given not by direct correspondence with things but in ordinary discourse – or ‘language games’ – that structure associations and distinctions, although these games can also be reelaborated anew. In different ways, Heidegger and Wittgenstein understood language as a realm of convention rooted in ordinary life and hence not amenable to metaphysical purification. The point of philosophy, they imply, is not to achieve objective knowledge of the world in order to bend it to our will but, rather, to help us recognise the limits of reason and to accommodate ourselves to live moderately within those limits.
One key later proponent of language-centred philosophy is Charles Taylor, whose ‘expressivism’ draws upon Continental thinkers such as Heidegger and Hegel to conceptualise human agency as a sense of self given through language and its conventions. For Taylor, the self cannot properly be conceived as an agent outside the socio-cultural and linguistic context that renders its choices, aversions and attachments in any way meaningful. For any action to make sense it must be described in relation to a pattern of meanings provided by a cultural tradition. To properly feel ‘shame’ or joy, we interpret our own behaviour as an appropriate instance of wider patterns of signification expressed by a given culture. Different cultures will therefore supply different meanings and no particular culture can authoritatively claim supremacy. Human agency, then, is never an isolated essence set apart from communally supplied language and meaning but is deeply bound up with culture and community. For Taylor, we should thus sustain the communities that support shared meanings and their conceptions of agency so protecting them from the tendency to ‘atomistic’ individualism typical of liberal society (see Taylor, 1989).
Similarly, the pragmatist philosopher, Richard Rorty, argues that language is a means not to attain an objective view of the world, as though we stood outside and separate from it, but a device for sustaining human ‘solidarity’ through conversation (see Rorty, 1991). In his view, seeing truth as a property of language and the metaphors that govern it underscores the contingency – the historical and geographical variability – of language games and the moral, aesthetic and emotional worlds they describe. Vocabularies change over time and hence they cannot be attributed a status beyond the practical circumstances with which they help us wrestle (Rorty, 1989). Solidarity thus trumps objectivity, supplying us with common terms, or shared metaphors to talk to eachother about the world. For Rorty, a ‘liberal’ order was one that sustained its conversation without violently or unthinkingly imposing moral vocabularies on individuals.
Taylor and Rorty both come to the linguistic turn from analytical philosophy, informed by Continental theory. Both contest the worldview of modern science and challenge its authority over the human world. In that respect they employ a broadly rhetorical appreciation of language as a flexible tool to make meaning and define the self and its attachment to community. In so doing they also understand the deep emotional capacity of language to supply subjective depth to experience and to bind individuals together. Yet neither is specifically interested in rhetoric as a resource or set of techniques for contesting political order. The communities and solidarities they see acheived through language seem already established rather than in need of making anew. The emotional orientation thus tends to be one of affirming traditions and sustaining consensus rather than challenging it.
A contrasting strand of thought emerging from the linguistic turn is found in so-called ‘post-structuralist’ philosophy and political theory. Drawing upon the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, thinkers such as Foucault and Lacan ‘decentred’ subjectivity, regarding the subject not as a natural bearer of universal qualities but a product of the differential meanings mobilised through discourse. Medical discourse, for example, constitutes the human body as an entity knowable by certain types of intellectual categorisation and techniques of investigation. Medical enquiries mobilise their authority over alternative ways of organising the world by presenting themselves as sources of ‘legitimate’ statements and commands. Post-structuralist attention to discourses of various kinds dwell upon the ways objects and subjects are established through operations of power and exclusion but also are open to subversion and rearticulation. Rather than speak to an identarian sense of cultural community or moral responsibility (as did Taylor and Rorty), post-structuralists are often preoccupied with the multiple differences that underlie, provoke and exceed claims to identity. There is for them no unified cultural or political subject outside ongoing efforts at discursive construction. Discourse is more a field of contest than a site of unified cultural expression.
It is this focus on the discursive construction of meaning and identity, and the power struggles that pervade such construction, that brings some post-structuralist political theories into alignment with rhetorical traditions. For Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), for example, the discursive character of all identity is achieved through antagonistic exclusion. All-encompassing social identities – such as ‘workers’ or ‘citizens’ – become motivating terms by virtue of setting a limit (a difference or discursive ‘frontier’) that separates one group from a globally opposing other (such as ‘capitalists’ or ‘foreigners’). The effort to draw that limit, to inscribe a variety of different elements within an encompassing whole, is what they regard as the essence of politics and this they designate as the struggle for ‘hegemony’. Discursive antagonism marks the symbolic limit to an objective identity, specifying a ‘blockage’ to an ultimate fulfulment that at the same time confers a contingent – and illusory, if mistaken for natural – unity. For Laclau (who draws upon Lacan), social struggles for hegemony operate upon a rhetorical terrain, principally of metaphor (see Laclau, 2014). Different social identities come to be unified only by way of their symbolic figuration around a discursive principle that aligns them against a common antagonist and so grounds society upon an apparent fullness that nonetheless evades it.
Laclau’s reference to rhetoric is raised in a theoretical discussion about the grounds of social and political identity. As such it remains at a very high level of abstraction rather than a reflection on concrete rhetorical practices. Nonetheless, it manages to grasp something of the profoundly emotional resonance of rhetorical figures: antagonism describes a deeply affective sense of threat and identification through which psychic investments come to have a personal grip on us as subjects. A similar attention to passionate commitment as the basis of political subjectivity is explored in Chantal Mouffe’s individual work on ‘agonistic’ democracy (see Mouffe, 2013: 181-90). In this instance, however, antagonism is discussed in relation to practices of political encounter and exchange. Mouffe argues against so-called ‘deliberative democrats’ who present democracy as the formation of a consensus based on rational procedures of engagement. To many deliberative democrats, dialogue must be conducted on a level ground defined by rational principles of exchange (which typically precludes ‘rhetorical’ appeals, often taken to be excessively emotional). But for Mouffe democracy is a means to engage and tame antagonism, not reach rational agreement. For her, the urge to secure consensus erases the deep conflicts (and passions) that motivate all political identity and so pushes these outside the democratic system where they may become dangerous, antipolitical forces (see Mouffe, 1993). The point of democracy, she claims, is to bring antagonists together to engage eachother as ‘adversaries’ who, at very least, respect eachother’s right to differ, rather than come to comprehensive agreements. At best, this entails a ‘conflictual consensus’ between radically opposed forces (Mouffe, 2013: 191-206). Like Laclau, Mouffe does not engage the rhetorical tradition as such. But her ‘agonistic’ political theory is nonetheless a reflection upon the ways democratic discourses unavoidably mobilise powerful passions and feelings.
4.2	Neuroscience, Materialism and Affect
If the preoccupation with culture and discourse as sites of rhetorical constructions through emotion owes much to the linguistic turn, then more recent interest in the blending of emotions and reason has emerged from investigations in Neuroscience. Here the focus is on the material constitution of perception and understanding via neural pathways in the brain, rather than symbols and language as such. 
The development of so-called ‘emotion science’ has spawned a variety of reflections on how emotions function as bodily processes, incorporating rationality as one stage in the wider material unfolding of perception. Emotions are not ‘distortions’ of an otherwise independent reason but, according to neuroscientists, routinised brain-body systems that prepare and stimulate thought and body reactions behind the scenes of conscious awareness. The brain constantly functions outside consciousness to monitor the organism’s relation to its wider environment, filtering and selecting sensations that then allow it to prioritise cognition only for those matters that should directly concern it (see Damasio, 2006). Thus there is a split-second delay between an event and our physical and emotional reaction to it where neural circuits filter and select an appropriate response. Without such emotion systems, humans would be unable properly to assess their circumstances and stimulate the judgements appropriate to their environments. For example, minute perceptions of risk or danger involve our brains prompting us to attend to our safety, to withdraw or proceed with a heightened attention to our surroundings. Likewise, preconscious awareness of the success of an action permits us to extend it, to release hormones that make us feel elated and to continue with confidence.
Political scientists and analysts have drawn a variety of conclusions from the findings of neuroscientific research. Some such as George Marcus (2002) acknowledge the vital importance that emotions – conceived neuroscientifically – have for understanding reasoning processes in politics. Again contra the dismissal of rhetoric by deliberative democrats, he argues that emotions are fundamental for deliberation and reasoned communication. If citizens are to focus their attention on the reasons given for policy then they must be ever sensitive to danger, suspicious of the traps of tradition, and attentive to what might count as success. Far from being purely cognitive processes, these are emotionally activated responses that demand complex prior calibration and prompting from the engineering in our brains. In the work of political analysts such as George Lakoff (2008) or Drew Westen (2007), it is precisely the neural patterns activated by emotional appeals in political campaigning that figure our ‘gut’ instinct reponses to certain kinds of narrative and imagery. Lakoff, for instance, insists on metaphors of family as fundamental to the argumentative techniques utilised in American politics. These metaphors are culturally given yet so deeply inscribed that they shape neural systems and invoke reactions from voters outside any overt logic or conscious assessment. If political campaigns are to succeed they must speak the language of the emotions, whose patterns and pathways are revealed in neuroscience.
Alternatively, neuroscientific findings have prompted enquiry into the ways bodies interact with their environments beyond the realm of discourse. Scholars of ‘affect’ draw attention to the micro-level of perception and sensation – rather than the level of symbolisation in discourse or routine emotion – where difference and multiplicity are ever-present. Affects – the pre-conscious, pre-linguistic transformations that occur when material bodies and environments interact – are not simply prompts and cues for pre-wired discourses, as mainstream political scientists regard them. Rather, they are multi-layered processes across brain and body that exhibit a variety of possible reactions that may also subvert as well as reproduce established behaviour, inviting new kinds of reaction and new kinds of shared feeling. Thus Massumi (1995) looks to affects rather than emotions as a site of creative possibility. Emotions, in his view, are fixed brain-body routines involving the imposition of an existing ‘language’ upon sensation that packages it in normalised ways and closes off its possibilities. Likewise, for Connolly (2002), the split second delay revealed by neuroscience locates the crucial moment when the brain identifies a routine or, sometimes, pursues an alternative route. New kinds of sensation, interactions, or techniques for engaging the material world – for which emotional responses have not been established – thus open the way to cultivating different affective sequences that may disrupt and alter our normal behaviour, if only subtly. This, in Connolly’s view, opens the way to a more generous ethic of mutual interaction in a pluralistic society, where the material world constantly alters us and provokes new codes of experience and mutual association.
The philosophical exploration of affects, which often draws upon Spinoza or Nietzschean vitalism, foregrounds certain political and ethical possibilities but, unlike political scientists influenced by neuroscience, does not attend to rhetoric at all. In part this is a consequence of its proponents’ suspicion of discourse and language as categories that prioritise subjectivity, consciousness or human agency. Yet that is not to say that exploration of the materiality of affects lies entirely outside the realm of rhetoric. Indeed, its emphasis on the micro-level of sensation and the multiple layering of experience and perception, the way interactions stimulate novel and potentially subversive affects, points to a whole new realm beyond the dimension of argument that is, nonetheless, highly pertinent to rhetorical enquiry. For example, communication through technologies such as social media, architectural spaces and other such interactive materials, invite reflection on the way affect and discourse intertwine to reinvent modes of thinking and being.
5	Conclusion 
Although it is not reducible to emotion alone, rhetoric acknowledges an inescapable link between reasoning and the passions that often exceed rational thought. It is on this basis that speech was understood in classical times as both a form of public communication and, simultaneously, a way of binding together the community. Depending on how we view things, a rhetorical culture was either one that carefully manages its passions through spoken performances or one that invites deception and disorder into public life. As we have seen, ancient philosophers were mostly committed to a wisdom that engaged the soul’s passions so as to fold them into the higher good of the community. Modern philosophy, however, was inclined to separate reason and passion in search of a certainty brought through reason alone. Passions become recategorised as emotions, outside and inimical to the operations of abstract thought. Yet the relegation of passions to the body only encouraged the repressed to return. Philosophy’s linguistic turn and subsequent enquiries into culture, discourse and affects have, in different ways, reoccupied a premodern concern with how thought and passion combine. In this, many philosophers seek to reimagine ethical bonds as ways of coordinating affectual commitments, but now with a stronger emphasis on difference and plurality rather than commonality. 
The recent resurgence of emotions and passions as topics of intellectual enquiry, however, has entailed only a partial revival of the rhetorical tradition. If it is mentioned at all, rhetoric serves an abstract function as the name for certain figures of thought rather than a category for distinct kinds of action. This is, doubtless, due to the decline of speech performances as exemplars of communal integration. Nonetheless, if philosophical enquiry is ever to advance towards a form of praxis, then – whatever its claims to knowledge – it must eventually descend from the heavens and supply a rhetorical means both to motivate us and help us to move each other.
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